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Japs Keep Moving - This is a White Man’s Neighborhood [Photograph]. National Japanese 
American Historical Society. (c. 1920).  
 “Silence, I discover, is something you can actually hear.” 
– Japanese Proverb 
Special note to the reader: 
The action perpetrated against Japanese American citizens and immigrants by 
the United States of America during 1942-1945 is often defined as 
“internment.” However, I feel these words have historically been politically 
motivated to soften and erroneously undermine the true reality of an 
egregious offence committed by the United States government. Henceforth, I 
will refer to “internment” as “incarceration” and describe “internment camps” 
rightfully as “concentration camps.” 
  
Introduction 
        As Los Angeles emerged as a dominant economic powerhouse in the early 
1900s, it projected itself as a beacon of prosperity and opportunity for the 
national and international community alike. Immigration was already steadily 
increasing across the U.S., but for many The City of Angels became the new 
focal destination. One of many immigrant groups beckoned by opportunity 
was the Japanese, who answered the city’s insatiable demand for labour; a 
demand brought about by the city’s rapid growth. Ironically, the increased 
demand for labour stemmed not only from the necessity to forge a growing 
empire, but to replenish curtailed immigrant workers. Preceding groups, 
specifically the Chinese, were targeted by xenophobic exclusionary laws after 
being labelled as economic threats. Over time, the Japanese faced the same 
xenophobic barriers, but the alleged threat in this case was due to their 
uniquely established economic independence in California. As a result, 
economic fears from Anglo natives fuelled increasing anti-Japanese 
sentiment, and gave way to exclusionary measures and laws enacted to target 
ethnic Japanese residents. However, many of these targets were naturalised 
U.S citizens, or U.S. citizens by birth. 
Ultimately, the United States specifically and intentionally targeted the 
Japanese Americans of California—especially those in Los Angeles—for 
expulsion or incarceration in the 1930s. It was irrelevant that by at this point 
many of the targeted residents were U.S. citizens. Essentially, oppression was 
carried out with the ultimate intention of eliminating the Japanese presence 
from California as a threat of economic competition, but this threat was poised 
under the guise of a racial threat to Anglo supremacy. Evidence for this can be 
seen by the treatment of Los Angeles’ population of Japanese American 
residents via targeting by way of government agencies as evidenced through 
government documentation, land lease records, ballot measures that 
specifically identified the Japanese as a “problem”, and the extent to which 
such legality was enacted. Subsequent laws and vocal opposition further 
fuelled anti-Japanese sentiment to purposefully sow hysteria into popular 
imagination, which intensified in the 1920s and 1930s. This xenophobic 
agenda utilised methods including rhetorical tools of oppression via 
propaganda, such as the so-called “Yellow Peril”, increased enforcement and 
amendments to existing discriminatory and exclusionary laws, and collective 
ethnic scapegoating. 
As a result, the eventual attack on Pearl Harbor allowed policymakers and 
vocal opponents alike to capitalise on premeditated hysteria and xenophobia, 
which allowed for the most egregious unconstitutional offense in U.S. history: 
the forcible incarceration of approximately 70,000 U.S. citizens on the basis of 
ancestry.[1] In fact, plans of government-initiated “internment” had been 
discussed in government documents well before Japan’s attack on Pearl 
Harbor in 1941. Unfortunately, the attack merely created the perfect storm to 
execute the aforementioned agenda to curtail economic influence in the 
economy through their forced dismissal. However, despite these challenges, 
Japanese communities in Los Angeles—particularly Terminal Island—sought 
to maintain normalcy, ultimately showcasing their resilience. 
Well into the 1920s, the Progressive Era’s residual racism was conspicuous 
and omnipresent in journalism. Preoccupied with concepts of tough love 
moral reform and eugenics, newspapers and government records alike alluded 
to the racial presence of the Japanese as an economic threat. When viewing 
such documents, it is important to determine whether the argument being 
made is racial or economic. At times, it is hard to ascertain when Japanese 
citizens were not solely the subject of racist rhetoric or the subject of blame 
concerning another subtle underlying problem overshadowed by methodical 
ethnic scapegoating. To put it bluntly, racism was ubiquitous in public 
discourse; derogatory remarks—especially by contemporary standards—
littered official and unofficial documents, making any and all secondary 
attacks that deviate from race difficult to decipher. 
However, a disturbing trend emerged from the pre-war years up until Pearl 
Harbor, and that is the fact that Japanese Americans were caught in the 
crosshairs of the primary driver of Anglo Los Angeles: money. Ultimately, by 
capitalising on racial sentiment sowed in the public consciousness, the U.S.—
and California specifically—facilitated the passing of exclusionary laws which 
sought to economically undermine the alleged Japanese threat by means of 
racism. In turn, this marriage of rhetoric and sentiment perpetuated the most 
grievous act a democracy can commit: the stripping of constitutional and civil 
rights from its citizens. 
Brief Background and Timeline of Exclusionary Measures 
        Between 1880 and 1940, the U.S. had already enacted more than a dozen 
laws and subsequent amendments regarding immigrant policy.[2] Japanese 
Americans were not only subjected to various elements of these existing laws, 
but additional exclusionary acts and quotas were created to target ethnic 
Japanese specifically.[3]At the heart of these laws were economic concerns, 
and Japan itself was privy to the first unofficial attempt to curb Japanese 
immigration with the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1906.[4] Essentially, the 
Gentleman’s Agreement stipulated a non-formalised restriction on 
immigration to the U.S. from Japan, unlike the formalised restriction the U.S. 
had previously imposed on China. The U.S. honoured the non-formalised pact, 
and in exchange Japan revoked passports to the U.S. 
In Senator James D. Phelan’s 1919 publication, The Japanese Evil in 
California, he criticized President Theodore Roosevelt for his soft stance on 
the bargain with Japan over immigration: “Japan had just emerged from 
successful war against China; she had taken Formosa; she had assumed 
control of Korea, and she had beaten Russia”.[5] In other words, because 
Japan had established itself as an emerging power, the U.S. had, from Phelan’s 
perspective, bowed to Japan. This was the impetus from which many anti-
Japanese immigration opponents drew the imaginary line for the failure of the 
U.S. to halt Japanese immigration sooner. However, as Phelan pointed out, 
this did little to address what his contemporary colleague, journalist V.S. 
McClatchy, dubbed “The Japanese Problem”.[6] 
Essentially, the California Alien Land Law of 1913 excluded Japanese and 
other immigrant groups, such as Chinese, Koreans, and Indians, from owning 
land, but land could be leased, albeit for significantly reduced periods of 
time.[7] However, the act was further amended in 1920, further decreasing 
time on leases, which prevented Japanese from owning stock pertaining to 
agricultural land. It additionally required aliens—or their guardians—to 
submit an annual report on their activities.[8]Although never mentioned 
exclusively in the land code itself, this particular law targeted Japanese as seen 
in the ballot guide from 1920: 
“Its primary purpose is to prohibit Orientals who cannot become American 
citizens from controlling our rich agricultural lands […] Orientals, and more 
particularly Japanese, having commenced to secure control of agricultural 
lands in California. […] the proportion already controlled in some counties 
being from 59 to 73 per cent. Control of the products of the soil by a unified 
interest such as the Japanese will lead to economic control of the country. 
That will be followed in time by political control through force of numbers 
induced by the heavy birth rate”.[9] 
In 1940, the Alien Act was imposed that automatically made all non-U.S. born 
Japanese “alien.” All subsequent “aliens” were required to register and be 
fingerprinted for government record.[10] 
The Perceived Japanese Economic Threat and Subsequent Racial 
Threat 
        Foremost, what made Japanese immigrants unique from most other 
immigrant groups was a penchant to seek out arable land rather than typically 
residing in urban centres, which historians Brian Gaines and Wendy K. Tam 
Cho covered extensively in surveying the impact of California’s Land Act and 
Immigrant Act of 1924.[11] For this reason, Japanese Americans ultimately 
found themselves in the public crosshairs of U.S. economic whistle-blowers as 
early as 1901, as noted by The Industrial Commission on Immigration which 
was keenly that Japanese Americans migrated out of urban centres. As its 1901 
report concluded: “In the state of California alone there is today a great army 
of Japanese coolies…They do not colonize as do the Chinese; they are 
scattered throughout the state”.[12]Additionally, it further implied they had 
nefariously infiltrated California in that they had gone “almost unnoticed, and 
without exciting either suspicion or alarm. [The Japanese labourer] crept into 
the country and established itself in almost every line of industry along our 
Pacific coast”.[13] 
As economist Masao Suzuki noted, the Japanese provided a service to 
California, and Los Angeles in particular, by strengthening the economy 
through agriculture.[14]Historian T.H. Watkins, in writing about the Great 
Depression, concurred by attributing most of the economic prosperity in the 
pre-war depression to this agricultural labour, and posited that the decline of 
such was a strong factor in worsening the depression. As Watkins argued, 
there was a “monoculture” which required a “large and cheap labour force” 
that the Caucasian population could not fill, due to the fact that “the white 
population had been thin from the outset” because of “too many superior jobs” 
in Los Angeles required for “a state still building its population and its 
economy”.[15] Furthermore, with cheap labour, agriculture was lucrative in 
that “costs and revenues could be most easily calculated and controlled and 
where volume could help to offset market fluctuations”.[16] Japanese 
Americans provided an invaluable service to the U.S., not only by providing 
cheap labour, but by incorporating what historian Linda Ivey dubbed 
“conservative methods”[17] and what Suzuki credited as introducing new 
crops to further drive output.[18] 
However, as Suzuki outlined, as Japanese Americans sought self-
sustainment—as is the dream of every U.S. citizen and immigrant alike—
suspicious opponents turned volatile when Japanese American labourers 
advocated for better treatment, pay, and initiated self-ventures into 
agriculture by way of leased land.[19] Carey McWilliams, a journalist 
sympathetic to the cause of migrant labourers, composed a detailed 
breakdown of the perceived economic threat posed by the Japanese in his 
1939 book, Factories in the Field: The Story of Migratory Farm Labour in 
California. McWilliams highlighted that the presence of Japanese Americans 
was tolerable as long as they assumed vacancies left by the shortage of migrant 
labour due to the aforementioned exclusionary acts. However, their place as 
labourers, and nothing more, was the only stipulation for their continued 
welcome. This was made ominously clear by John D. MacKenzie, the 
Commissioner of Labour Statistics, who succinctly stated in 1909 that “the 
moment this ambition [land-ownership] is exercised, that moment the 
Japanese ceases to be an ideal labourer“.[20]As Gaines and Cho both note, the 
issue of Japanese immigration was economic; racial rhetoric was merely 
employed as the means to dually demonise the Japanese in the agenda to 
disenfranchise them.[21] As McWilliams also concluded, “The real prejudice 
against the Japanese, however, dates from the time when they began to be 
small owners, rather than farm labourers”.[22] 
Accordingly, the language in both government documents and press outlets 
increasingly portrayed the Japanese as duplicitous, inferior, and dangerous. 
The economic element prevailed as ammunition, but the weapon became 
racial. Even those unopposed to the dominance of Japanese Americans in 
agriculture, directly or indirectly, adopted racial undertones. In a 1910 edition 
of the Saturday Evening Post, Forrest Crissey remarked that “Californians 
owe a distinct debt to the dark invaders for demonstrating—as they 
themselves have not demonstrated—the productive possibilities of their soil 
and climate.”[23] However, this statement, while arguably positive, contained 
racially charged elements that stereotyped and exotified the perception of the 
agriculturally inclined Japanese—a trend incorporated by critics and coupled 
with retaliatory racial remarks. Crissey further added racial tones by arguing 
that Europeans had effectually grown lazy due to industrialisation and would 
benefit from instruction by “peasants of the Old World”.[24] Regardless, Cho 
and Gaines, Suzuki—and even Crissey—all came to the conclusion that the 
Japanese farmer essentially outperformed its Anglo counterpart. 
In once more examining Senator James D. Phelan’s 1919 publication, The 
Japanese Evil in California, Phelan erroneously predicts that Los Angeles, 
being “one of the most fertile counties in the State”, would experience a future 
population of “White 48 percent, Japanese 33.4 percent, Mexican 8.2 percent, 
Chinese .1 percent, and Negro .3 percent”.[25] Additionally, in trying to 
support his survey, he enlisted a County Health officer to confirm that 
Japanese residents would experience a “three thousand per cent increase!” 
and then stated that “one-third of the births in Los Angeles” would be 
Japanese, thus “the unavoidable conclusion to be drawn from these figures is 
that, where the Japanese come, the whites go”.[26] However, upon examining 
his figures closely, he carefully added toward the end of the booklet that the 
information he used to equate such numbers of Japanese American residents 
came from “the rural sections of Los Angeles County”.[27] In other words, 
Phelan reported the overall Caucasian birth rate from the entirety of Los 
Angeles County, but then disproportionately juxtaposed it with Japanese birth 
rates from selected areas in rural regions.[28] 
Additionally, the Native Sons of the Golden West (NSGW), an organisation 
that sought to preserve California history (which, as of this writing, still exists 
today under different principles), published in their 1924 edition of the 
monthly newspaper, The Grizzly Bear, equally misleading information about 
the “unassimilability of Japanese Americans [sic]”, and birth 
rates.[29] Furthermore, while they declared their organisation was open to 
any Californian-born person, they purposely sought to “stigmatize all 
Japanese Americans, including American-born”.[30] Unsurprisingly, the 
NSGW partnered with the California Joint Commission to pressure 
representatives to “lobby for exclusion of all Asian immigrants” and 
maintained close relationships with like-minded contemporaries of the time, 
most notably Senators and a State Attorney General.[31] 
In 1921, Irwin Wallace’s book, Seed of the Sun, entered the public imagination 
as he fictitiously portrayed the Japanese intent to overthrow the U.S. The 
characters engage in various acts of subversion, such as intentionally 
sabotaging harvests, opposing assimilation, resisting Americanisation, and 
ultimately poising themselves to impregnate American women in order to 
populate the U.S. with Japanese—which he implied could result from the 
influence the Japanese Emperor had over Japanese Americans.[32] In 1929, 
V.C. McClatchy, a newspaper publisher, further added to anti-Japanese 
sentiment by publishing a pamphlet “On the Japanese Problem.” McClatchy, 
along with Phelan, vehemently advocated for passing the California Land Act, 
and also like Phelan, McClatchy grossly and egregiously produced erroneous 
projections of speculative spikes in the Japanese population. He argued that a 
“grave racial problem” would occur as Japanese might “colonise favourable 
sections of the United States” to ultimately “serve the ambition of Japan in 
world subjugation”.[33] 
However, McClatchy’s rhetoric quickly honed in on the racial component, and 
equated superiority with population, ownership of land, and proposed that 
Japanese language schools, churches, and other elements in Japanese 
communities subverted youth with Japanese propaganda.[34] This was 
detrimental, as children were reprimanded when caught speaking Japanese in 
school, and Japanese textbooks were consequently pulled from 
schools.[35] The racial element was front and centre in the debate over the 
“Japanese Problem”, as McClatchy’s pamphlet only cited one economic fact, 
which claimed in “1920 the Japanese had secured control through ownership 
or lease of from 50% to 85%”.[36] Although the estimates varied, the alarming 
trend was the preoccupation with Japanese economic stability. 
As a contemporary of McWilliams, Charles Roger Hicks, a journalist and 
former middle school teacher in Kyoto, wrote his sympathetic and aptly titled 
1921 article “The Japanese Problem in California”. Hicks tried to objectively 
examine “sympathizers” and “opponents” but ultimately rebuked those similar 
to Phelan and McClatchy, and stated that “there is no Japanese problem 
except in men’s minds. But some minds are very active in this 
respect”.[37] Hicks argued there were “three divisions” which concerned the 
alarmist attitudes towards Japanese Americans; all of which he claimed were 
categorised as either economically motivated proponents of anti-Japanese 
sentiment, or “practical men” that recognised the logical fallacies presented by 
writers such as Phelan and McClatchy: 
“First, men who for economic reasons have found, or think they 
are going to find, the Japanese of advantage to them. Second, men 
who for economic reasons have found, or think they are going to 
find, the Japanese of disadvantage to them. Third, practical men 
who have not become particularly interested economically in the 
problem”.[38] 
        Additionally, Hicks further argued that the core nature of anti-Japanese 
sentiment was economic and driven by political agendas in writing he 
contemplated creating a “fourth group”, which comprised “certain types of 
politicians who find it in their advantage to shout from the housetops their 
vituperations against the Japanese”.[39] However, as he cynically remarked: 
“I have rather thought of these men of yellow-journalistic capacities as coming 
under vision ‘two,’” as they used “personal economic advantage to make 
capital of what hysterical tendencies they can manipulate conveniently in 
agitating for a political or journalistic following”.[40]Furthermore, Hicks 
honed in again on the economic nature of anti-Japanese sentiment and argued 
that “no matter what basic problem may lie hidden…moral or racial from 
practical economics, little disturbance follows”.[41] However, once rhetoric 
and hysteria perpetuated some “underlying fundamental” it would inevitably 
“manifest an economic situation where action comes like a 
whirlwind”.[42] Hicks also argued the economic element revealed itself in 
relation to the fear of interracial marriages. He stated that opposition to 
interracial marriage acted as “the ultimate base upon which the economic 
considerations stand”.[43] According to Hicks, this manifested ultimately as 
heightened arguments of assimilation with the initiation of a superficial 
argument concerning the threat of intermarried Anglo women. He further 
argued that in the case of “the Negro”, there was little argument which 
concerned whether African Americans could assimilate, because unlike Asian 
populations, “the Negro has too little economic push and initiative to worry 
us”.[44]Although Hicks maintained a proactive stance in his article, he and 
others like him were drowned out by the “yellow media”. 
Ultimately, the reaction to Japanese Americans was so vehement that the 
ballot guide for the 1920 California Land Act stated: “Better to let some land 
lie idle, and a few large landholders make less profit, and even see production 
decrease somewhat” and urged landowners to refrain from hiring Japanese 
labourers because “At present the small farmer who needs labour can get none 
from the Japanese, because they demand leases and cooperative 
management.”[45] However, the ballot blatantly took a much more racial 
approach and attempted to sow alarm as it declared that “land tends to fall 
into possession of the race occupying the pivotal place in the labour 
supply”.[46] In one notorious photo, a woman stands defiantly in front of a 
house. Her finger points up to highlight the infamous sign hanging from the 
roof of her house: “Japs keep moving this is a white man’s 
neighbourhood”.[47] This image is often erroneously cited as a post-1942 
photo, but in actuality the photo was taken in the 1920s, and it was to 
demonstrate that those of Japanese ancestry were not permitted to live in 
Anglo neighbourhoods.[48] 
Consequently, the effects of the Land Act are demonstrated in various letters 
found by apprehensive lessors. A plethora of these leases and accompanying 
personal correspondences between the lessors and lessees can be found in the 
California State University, Dominguez Hills Japanese American Digitization 
Project archive. In 1926, James Kobata, whose letterhead identified him as a 
grower from Gardena, pleaded in a letter: “I would like to know if it is possible 
for us to renew the lease on the land in Torrance. If you will let us have it 
again, will you let us know. This year we will use only about one half of the 
land” [sic].[49] Literally hundreds of documents pertaining to land leases are 
archived, such as the above one from Kobata. These act as evidence which 
illustrated the ever-decreasing amount of time allotted for leasing land, and 
the desperation of Japanese farmers.[50] 
Resilience and Search for Normalcy 
        In surveying the Japanese American communities of Los Angeles, the 
most resonant theme is resilience. Where there were no opportunities, 
Japanese Americans often created them. One notable example was presented 
by historian Sandra Davies; when there was no housing for students of 
Japanese descent at USC, students simply created their own fraternity: 
Gakusei Kai.[51] In the case of assimilation, many sought to assert their 
American-ness through something as simple as a name. In recalling how he 
came to be named Bruce, Bruce Kaji shared this humorous story: 
“Everybody was trading comic books, and I liked the name of the Batman, 
Bruce Wayne, so I started using Bruce as my personal name. And it wasn’t 
legal, but I used it every opportunity I could. So when I got out of the service I 
had Henry Tsurutani, an attorney in Little Tokyo, legalize it, and from that 
time on I used that as my legal name”.[52] 
Perhaps one of the most interesting stories of the Japanese American 
experience in Los Angeles occurred on Terminal Island. The island offered 
some seclusion, and allowed an arguably easier life for Japanese Americans 
than most other places in Los Angeles. The impetus behind the establishment 
of a community on Terminal Island was when Japanese fishermen made the 
extraordinary find of abalone. In 1903, a successful tuna canning company, 
the California Fish Co. opened, providing a steady place of employment, and 
Los Angeles experienced a steady output in fishing.[53]Sadly, and perhaps 
unsurprisingly, a new state law arose that banned fishing for abalone in 1905 
in efforts to undermine Japanese entrepreneurship.[54] Regardless, Terminal 
Island evolved as a self-sustaining community predominantly populated by 
Japanese Americans. Terminal Island granted Japanese culture a rare respite; 
as one former resident, Susumi Iwasaki, noted: “It was good. One good thing 
about it was all Japanese, you know. And we have a few Caucasian 
kids.”[55] Iwasaki also recounted how the island maintained both a church, a 
Buddhist temple, and a Japanese school. While he maintained that they 
“mostly spoke Japanese”, if they were caught in their Christian school they 
“were pretty strict” about speaking English, and one child caught speaking 
Japanese “got a spanking”.[56] One former resident, John Muramoto, also 
recalled how the community was close: “The families lived as one close, tightly 
knit family bound together by a common bond. Having the fathers go out to 
sea for long periods of time was a way of life”.[57] 
Additionally, residents kept Japanese culture alive by celebrating events, such 
as New Year’s Day, and enjoyed traditions of mochi and sake making, judo, 
kendo, and even threw annual Fish Flag and Doll festivals to share their 
culture with other Los Angeles residents.[58] Iwasaki also recalled how his 
father had put him through kendo, and that his kendo teacher had also been 
both a dentist and a teacher. He further shared enjoying playing baseball with 
his team, the “Skippers”, and joked that it was “the only entertainment for the 
older people to go and see”.[59] Iwasaki also recalled Deadman’s Island, a 
place in Los Angeles reclaimed for other reasons, where he went “in the 
summertime…and we used to make our own pup tents with 
gunnysacks”.[60] One surreal lesson that Iwasaki shared was when a reverend 
came to from East L.A. to teach the boys Morse code. The irony of learning 
Morse code was not lost on Iwasaki, as many close to the shore were accused 
of disloyalty and accused of attempting to contact Japanese spies. Iwasaki also 
recollected his last day on the island during the evacuation: 
“When the war broke out, I was in the eighth grade and fourteen years old. 
And I remember the day when the, the army personnel came and delivered 
that message that we had to leave Terminal Island in forty-eight hours. And 
that was pretty rough. I mean, for, you know, my dad. And it was… he never 
left Terminal Island to begin with and so there was no storage area or nothing. 
But somehow or another he managed to store some of the stuff someplace. I 
don’t know how he ever did that. And then we, we had, one of the few 
fortunate people that used to have a car. And all that stuff that’s, was in the 
store, the barbershop, he left it. And we couldn’t take it. The mirrors and the 
chairs and furnitures and beds and everything was left all there. The worst 
thing that ever happened to me was on, when everybody left, my dad and… it 
was what? Four more other kids, my mother, and they left for L.A. And I was 
left there by myself. And I was sitting on the porch and some guy came on a 
pickup and says, ‘Hey, what are you doing here?’ I says, ‘Well, I’m waiting for 
my folks to pick me up.’ And of course they never came, came back”.[61] 
While Iwasaki eventually met up with his parents in Los Angeles, no one 
returned to Terminal Island. Old family photographs and the recounted 
memories from those such as Iwasaki and Muramoto are all that remain to 
preserve the unique culture which existed on Terminal Island. 
The Plan for Interment before Pearl Harbor 
        In 1937 and 1938, the Empire of Japan attacked Shanghai and Nanking, 
respectively. News headlines fed into public hysteria as the U.S. shifted 
uncomfortably concerning its place—or as yet, a lack of—in the war. The Los 
Angeles Examiner published a front page article in 1937 that detailed possible 
scenarios for an attack on the U.S., which included the ominous possibly of an 
attack on Pearl Harbor.[62] William Randolph Hearst, the notorious 
newspaper tycoon, acted as a catalyst for the hysteria as he churned out 
headline after headline feeding the public with sensationalist threats the 
Japanese posed, and propaganda which resembled that of “Yellow 
Peril”.[63] At this point, the need to present an economic argument was 
supplemental, and all rhetoric was almost entirely racial in nature. 
Michi Weglyn, a self-described internee turned author, researched the years 
prior to the attack extensively to understand her own experience. The 
information she accumulated was damning. Similarly, Alice Yang Murray, a 
historian and history professor for UC Santa Cruz, also focused on the 
preemptive measures used against Japanese Americans that appeared to be 
economic in nature. Although both provide insights on the economic factors 
that disenfranchised Japanese American residents before and after 
incarceration, the running theme is once again racial. However, in 
constructing a broad narrative made from their arguments and uncovered 
government documents, the original argument from 1901 is still the crucial 
piece to a complex puzzle that is part of pre-WWII Los Angeles’ Japanese 
xenophobia. As a result, it is imperative to view the following evidence 
chronologically. 
In 1940, after the passage of the Alien Act, whereby all non-U.S. born 
Japanese registered with government agencies and were fingerprinted, all 
Japanese—born in the U.S. or not—who had travelled outside the U.S. after 
June 17th, 1940 had their assets frozen. For those who had not travelled outside 
the U.S., it became a requirement to file a Federal Inventory Form (TFR-300) 
if assets had a value of $1,000 or greater.[64] Additionally, this came with the 
stipulation that property was not allowed to depreciate.[65] At this period in 
time, a special commission disclosed that at least 50 percent of Japanese 
worked in agriculture, their land was appreciated at $279.96 per acre versus 
the California farmer’s which averaged a comparatively measly $37.94 per 
acre, and a rough estimate found Japanese American farms to be worth 
roughly $78 million in 1940.[66] The message became quite clear: keep the 
Japanese contained, restrict travel, and maintain surveillance of assets. 
Ultimately, before the decision was made to “relocate” the Japanese, several 
cities–notably San Francisco and Los Angeles—held hearings between 
February and March of 1942, discussing implications and concerns with 
relocation to concentration camps.[67] One particular meeting of note was 
The House Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration (or 
Tolan Committee Hearings), where transcripts of testimonies revealed two 
sources who specifically identified the root concern as economic. The first 
testimony from Clarence E. Rust, noted in the transcripts as a lawyer, argued 
that the motivation to incarcerate was simply a bid to acquire property and 
financially dispossess the Japanese competition in agriculture: 
“The clamor seems to come from chambers of commerce, Associated Farmers, 
and the newspapers notorious as spokesmen for reactionary interests. In view 
of this fact, effort should be made to determine whether there is any 
connection between the clamor for the dispossession of the Japanese farmers 
and the desire of these clamoring interests to get possession of the Japanese 
farms and the elimination of the Japanese competition”.[68] 
        Likewise, in describing public fear over the Japanese, Esther S. Boyd 
argued that the fear of Japanese was “not due to fear of sabotage, it [was] due 
to economic reasons” because ultimately “the white farmer would have more 
land and more water if he could get rid of the Japanese, and he could demand 
a higher price for his farm produce”.[69] Overall, the hearings were in favour 
of relocation, with “elected political leaders, American Legion representatives, 
and business owners” advocating for removal, while those opposed were 
described as providing “ambiguous or timid statements”.[70] While the 
hearings were meant to provide supplemental feedback to the War Relocation 
Authority (WRA), the final report was not published until May of 1942—
months after relocation.[71] As Robert Shaffer, a historian and professor for 
Shippensburg University Pennsylvania, noted, the Tolan committee 
“represent[ed] the abdication of responsibility by mainstream liberalism 
during World War II for the mistreatment of Japanese Americans”.[72] 
       Regardless, the testimonies from the Tolan Committee and the itemisation 
of Japanese assets represent the agenda that disenfranchised the Japanese. 
This began first behind closed doors with an economic agenda, but came to 
fruition as racial persecution virulently manifested into a public forum. There 
is damning evidence to assert that government powers surveyed assets and 
land values as a premeditated act for the ultimate goal of seizure and 
redistribution pending forced Japanese incarceration. Accordingly, in the 
following declassified government documents, there is clear evidence that 
detailed the intent to incarcerate Japanese U.S. citizens—which were all 
documented before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. 
In a correspondence dated August 18th, 1941—more than 3 months before 
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor—between Congressman John D. Dingell of 
Michigan and President Franklin Roosevelt, Dingell maintained that the 
Japanese retention of American citizens would not go unpunished. Rather, he 
argued, Japan should keep in mind that “the Government of the United States 
will cause the forceful detention or imprisonment in a concentration camp of 
ten thousand alien Japanese in Hawaii” and “it would be well to further 
remind Japan that there are perhaps one hundred fifty thousand additional 
alien Japanese in the United States who will be held in a reprisal reserve 
whose status will depend upon Japan’s next aggressive move”.[73] 
In further declassified government documents procured by Murray, the U.S. 
revealed yet another a more nefarious motive. On October 28th, 1941—roughly 
a month and a half before Pearl Harbor—a mutual agreement between 
Panama and the U.S. outlined the “if” of the U.S. possibly “interning” 
Japanese Americans, or Nisei. Namely, if the U.S. incarcerated Japanese 
residents, Panama would willingly do the same and, without question, deport 
Japanese Panamanians to the U.S.[74] As the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, 
Edwin C. Wilson, wrote: 
“My conversations with the Foreign Minister regarding the question of 
internment of Japanese in the event that we suddenly find ourselves at war 
with Japan. The attitude of the Panamanian Government is thoroughly 
cooperative. […] Briefly, their thought is this: Immediately following action by 
the United States to intern Japanese in the United States, Panama would 
arrest Japanese on Panamanian territory and intern them on Taboga Island 
[…] The United States Government would agree to hold Panama harmless 
against any claims which might arise as a result of internment”.[75] 
Essentially, these documents incriminate the U.S. government by proving that 
it had, in fact, planned Japanese American incarceration well before Pearl 
Harbor. It appears that the U.S. was not only anticipating the possibility of 
interment, but rather fully expected it. These documents, a declassified few 
out of many that may never be seen, also reveal how far the U.S. was willing to 
go to orchestrate such a devious agenda. Alarmingly, this showed intent to 
unconstitutionally strip a U.S. citizen of several constitutional and legal rights 
strictly on the basis of a descendant’s birthplace. It is also important to note 
that the U.S. was not at war with Japan, nor had they entered the European 
theatre, with the exception of a few American volunteers in the U.K. 
Additionally, the U.S. encouraged sovereign countries in South America to join 
the U.S. in circumventing national and international law to engage in 
systematic disenfranchisement, regardless of legality. As a result, during the 
incarceration of Japanese Americans in the U.S., some estimated 2,200 
Japanese Peruvians were transported across the U.S. border, and, being 
officially stateless and “illegal” in the U.S., there was no means for justice for 
these incarcerated persons to be sought.[76] Essentially, once transported 
across U.S. territory, these people all but ceased to exist and were at the mercy 
of the U.S. government. 
On November 7th, 1941, the Report on Japanese on the West Coast of the 
United States, or simply the “Munson Report”, was delivered to President 
Roosevelt.[77]The report was commissioned as a barometer to sense the tide 
of Japanese American sentiment for Imperial Japan, and, despite some 
outliers, it concluded that there was no reason to suspect any loyalty to 
Japan.[78] In fact, the report took the issue so lightly, it quoted the 
nonsensical poem “The Walrus and the Carpenter” from Alice Through the 
Looking Glass to convey the tediousness in finding disloyalty to the 
U.S.[79] Additionally, on its opening page, it ironically defined the Nissei as 
showing “a pathetic eagerness to be Americans.”[80] Unfortunately, this 
report fell on deaf ears following Pearl Harbor, only marked with a receipt in 
January 1942 that the administration had reviewed it.[81] 
Conclusion: Shikata ga Nai 
        On December 7th, 1941, the Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Many 
Japanese Americans condemned the attacks, although a miniscule few 
pledged loyalty to Japan.[82] On February 19th, 1942, President Franklin 
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which gave the U.S. virtual carte 
blanche to retain persons of Japanese ancestry in unconditional incarceration 
at the discretion of the government. While those of “Japanese descent” were 
the only ethnic group forcibly incarcerated, the order left plenty of loopholes 
to incarcerate other groups if necessary. The original wording was aimed 
towards “control of alien enemies,”[83]not the Japanese exclusively, which the 
infamous posters often alluded to with the wording of “Instructions to all 
persons of Japanese ancestry”.[84] However, with the exception of suspected 
saboteurs and spies, no other group was collectively targeted, and certainly no 
other group was targeted solely by race. The newly formed WRA “evacuated” 
the West Coast of an estimated 110,000–120,000 people of Japanese 
ancestry—70,000 of whom were U.S. citizens—and placed them into ten 
camps spread in sparse areas of the U.S.[85] Hauntingly, one camp survivor, 
Shizuko Ina, wrote in her diary: “I wonder if today is the day they’re going to 
line us up and shoot us”.[86] The process by which U.S. citizens lost their 
assets was not unlike the Aryanisation of Jews in Nazi Germany. 
Although many Japanese Americans returned to Los Angeles in attempts to 
resume their lives, most would not return to their original homes. More 
disturbingly, the losses witnessed by Japanese Americans were never fully 
accounted for, nor was any attempt made to tally their losses.[87] In other 
words, there is no known report that attempted to document or estimate the 
amount of land and assets that were seized. In 1988, more than 40 years after 
incarceration, President Ronald Regan signed the Civil Liberties Act, offering 
73,000[88] survivors a symbolic and conciliatory sum of 
$20,000.[89] Arguably, no amount of money could ever rectify such an 
egregious act, but acknowledgement was crucial. 
Immigration is the foundation upon which the United States was and 
continues to be forged—the cornerstone of a nation whose identity is 
theoretically defined by free enterprise and self-determination. This continues 
by virtue of successive cultural and generational interjection, expression, and 
the inevitable layers of intersectionality which exist within society. Japanese 
Americans were denied a voice early in this process, they contributed 
significantly to forging the landscape and identity of Los Angeles. The 
conundrum of Americans seeking to project a singular or homogenous 
national identity emanates from a simple contradictory assumption: that 
identity emerges from adherence to static concepts within interminably 
dynamic societies. Multiplicities of expression—from immigrants and 
“natives” alike— endlessly subject the idea of a singular identity to incessant 
scrutiny and validation, thus verifying the transitory nature of the U.S. and the 
inevitable fluidity of national identity. It is impossible to reconcile the concept 
of a fixed national identity with that of a dynamic national identity in constant 
flux due to immigration. The result is the cyclical hallmark of the alarmingly 
problematic and definitively American oxymoron: static transitory 
xenophobia. 
Historically, immigrants and “minorities” are tolerated at best if they do not 
pose an economic threat. Immigrants are at their most vulnerable until they 
are citizens, yet Japanese American citizens were subjected to further 
hardship due to the actions of the government of their ancestral homeland. If 
immigrants or other ethnically designated undesirables ascend to the realm of 
economic sustainability, they pose the threat of potentially subverting Anglo 
racial supremacy. If this threat is perceived by the Anglo majority, they thus 
come under the real, tangible threats of being declared subversive, 
disenfranchised, or branded as social pariahs under the umbrella of different 
buzzwords which serve as shortcuts for racial animus. 
An example of this xenophobic political strategy can be examined in a more 
contemporary context. In 1981, Lee Atwater, an advisor to Presidents Reagan 
and Bush Sr., candidly admitted that it was acceptable in 1954 to say “n****r” 
to describe a specific ethnic group. However, “by 1968 you can’t say ‘n****r’—
that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like uh, forced busing, states’ rights, 
and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract”.[90] Additionally, he ceded 
that other buzzwords, such as “cutting taxes”, also alluded to the same topic at 
hand, and admitted that “all of these things you’re talking about are totally 
economic things and a by-product of them is, Blacks get hurt worse than 
whites”.[91] In the case of 1920s Los Angeles, racial epithets came to form 
buzzwords which addressed the perceived economic threat imposed by the 
Japanese. It is thus crucial to read between the lines when one examines the 
language used by those who target a particular group. Is this an economic 
argument, or a xenophobic argument? While no other U.S. immigrant groups 
have—knowingly—been subjected to such an egregious mistrial of justice as 
the Japanese, the future naturalized citizens of this country are at risk from 
the cyclical nature of xenophobia and elusive idea of identity. 
In Japanese culture, the phrase “shikata ga nai,” meaning “it cannot be 
helped”, is often raised to address such emotional conundrums.[92] It does 
not mean to resign oneself to injustice, but rather to motivate oneself to 
remain resilient when dealing with a situation that is beyond one’s control. It 
is the Japanese equivalent to the British colloquialism “Keep Calm and Carry 
On.” Unfortunately, the systematic disenfranchisement of an immigrant group 
is not something new in the U.S., but the treatment of Japanese Americans is a 
particularly dark chapter in U.S. history, as no previous group had ever been 
stripped of their constitutional rights in such a manner. Not to belabour a 
point, but these were largely American citizens who were vital to their 
communities and fully bought in to patriotic ideals. The age-old adage that 
history repeats itself has become something of a cliché, but, in this case, 
Japanese incarceration remains a sobering reminder of how easy it is to strip 
citizens of their rights—in full public display. 
When we study history, we strive to restrain our knee-jerk reactions 
concerning the present or attempts to draw parallels which might be tenuous 
or non-existent. This is often because we are often living in the eye of the 
storm, and as such, we cannot be objective. However, when immigrant policies 
are enacted in the U.S., it is important to stop and ask ourselves what the 
ulterior motive may be. Is it a racist agenda or an economic one? Is it one built 
on policies of nationalist isolation, or one built on racial supremacy through 
the veiled words of preserving culture? To what extent do these distinctions 
matter, and where do the lines blur? As human beings, these should be red 
flags we cannot ignore, nor should we allow ourselves to abdicate our moral 
authority and duty to speak out under the guise of maintaining objectivity. 
Regarding currently persecuted immigrant groups and, tragically, the 
inevitable persecution of the next group that emerges in this historical and 
cyclical pattern, we must not collectively utter “shikata ga nai.” 
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